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INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS:
BECOMING A PAPER TIGER?*
STEPHEN B. BURBANK**

In July 2011, I participated in a panel discussion in Germany
that was organized for corporate defense counsel. The underlying
premise was that German and other foreign companies need
protection against litigation in United States courts, and the goal
was to discuss strategies that would meet that need. Thus, for
instance, in a global litigation landscape that lacks the strict and
mutually binding lis pendens rule of the Brussels regime,1 is there
a tactical weapon comparable to the infamous ―Italian torpedo?‖
That colorful metaphor conceives a would-be plaintiff‘s case as a
ship and suggests the effect on it of conferring the benefits of the
EU‘s strict lis pendens rule on actions for a negative declaration
(declaratory judgment) when filed first in Italy‘s sclerotic judicial
system, which is badly in need of angioplasty.2

* © Stephen B. Burbank 2012
** David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of
Pennsylvania.
1 Article 21 of the Brussels Convention has been described as ―rigid,
mechanical and crude‖ by a common law court. Neste Chemicals SA v. DK Line
SA, [1994] 3 All E.R. 180 [184] (Eng.). This provision now appears as Article 27 of
Council Regulation 44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (providing that any court other
than the first in which action is brought must stay proceedings until jurisdiction in
the first is established and then must decline jurisdiction).
2 See Case C-406/92, The Maciej Rataj, Tatry v. Maciej Rataj, 1994 E.C.R. I05439 (―On a proper construction of Article 21 of the Convention, where it
requires, as a condition of the obligation of the second court seised to decline
jurisdiction, that the parties to the two actions be identical, that cannot depend on
the procedural position of each of them in the two actions.‖); Stephen B. Burbank,
All The World His Stage, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 741, 755–56 (2004) (reviewing ARTHUR
TAYLOR VON MEHREN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ADJUDICATORY AUTHORITY IN
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE DOCTRINE, POLICIES
AND PRACTICE OF COMMON- AND CIVIL-LAW SYSTEMS (2003)) (discussing von
Mehren‘s advocacy of a rule that would not give precedence to declaratory
judgment actions).
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Although I was delighted to participate in such a discussion, I
suggested that, even if still correct in 2011, the underlying premise
may be on the cutting edge of obsolescence. In my view, the need
of foreign companies for protection against litigation in U.S. courts
is less today than it has been in decades, in both absolute and
comparative dimensions. As evidence supporting that hypothesis,
I offer recent developments in three areas that are critical to access
to United States courts: class actions, pleading, and personal
jurisdiction.
The assault on class actions—which, given the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)3 and Supreme Court decisions
worshipping one particular, highly contestable, vision of
arbitration,4 should be deemed a two-pronged attack aimed at both
federal and state courts—is well underway. The class action
decision of the past few years that may be best known abroad
probably should not be described as such. I refer to Morrison v.
Nat’l Australia Bank,5 a 2010 decision in which the Court held that
Section 10(b), the antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange
Act,6 does not apply extraterritorially to provide a cause of action
to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for
3 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 19 Stat. 4 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). For an account of CAFA that sets it in historical
context and, while acknowledging a reasonable basis for federal legislation,
argues that the exceptions are too narrow, inappropriately denying state courts
the power to pursue an independent vision of class actions in cases where they
should have that power, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act in
Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (2008).
4 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding
that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts unconscionability analysis under
California law of class waivers in consumer contracts); Rent-A-Center, W. v.
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776–81 (2010) (holding that under the FAA where an
arbitration agreement expressly delegates the decision of the arbitration
agreement‘s enforceability to an arbitrator, a court may not intercede unless the
claim of unconscionability is directed to that particular provision of the arbitration
agreement); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int‘l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010)
(holding that the FAA prohibits arbitrators from imposing class arbitration absent
a contractual basis for concluding that the parties consented); see also Thomas J.
Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center,
Concepcion and the Future of Arbitration, AM. REV. INT‘L ARB. (forthcoming 2012)
(pointing to a pro-arbitration trend in recent court decisions that has limited the
judiciary‘s oversight of arbitration). ―Now, however, it should be apparent that in
its zeal to further its evolving vision of the [Federal Arbitration Act] the Court has
eliminated key safeguards aimed at ensuring fundamental fairness to consumers
and employees in arbitration.‖ Id. (manuscript at 113).
5 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
6 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
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alleged misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign
exchanges.
For American scholars of international civil litigation, Morrison
is chiefly of interest because Justice Scalia was able to carry a
majority in favor of a presumption against extraterritorial
application of a federal statute that the lower federal courts—led
by the great Second Circuit judge, Henry Friendly—had applied
extraterritorially for more than forty years.7 That said, no Justice
who participated (Justice Sotomayor did not) disagreed with the
result in this so-called ―f-cubed‖ case—foreign plaintiffs
purchasing shares of a foreign issuer on a foreign exchange. One
reason may have been that, having acknowledged that ―it is a rare
case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all contact
with the territory of the United States,‖8 the majority made quite a
convincing argument based on the language of the statute that
―Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the
purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.‖9
What does Morrison have to do with class actions? It was
brought as a class action on behalf of foreign purchasers of the
defendant bank‘s ordinary shares. Moreover, although empirical
studies suggest that some institutional investors prefer to opt out
of class actions in order to pursue individual litigation under the
securities laws,10 class actions are undoubtedly more likely than
individual actions to make potential foreign defendants quake
7 See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding
that anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws ―[a]pply to losses from
sales of securities to Americans resident abroad if, but only if, acts (or culpable
failures to act) of material importance in the United States have significantly
contributed thereto‖ but ―[d]o not apply to losses from sales of securities to
foreigners outside the United States unless acts (or culpable failures to act) within
the United States directly caused such losses‖); see Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878–80,
2883 (critically reviewing the Second Circuit‘s development of its own
extraterritoriality tests and holding that there must be an ―affirmative indication‖
of Congress‘s intent for a law to apply extraterritorially).
8 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878-80, at 2884.
9 Id. at 2888.
10 See Joshua H. Vinik et al, Why Institutional Investors are Opting Out of ClassAction
Litigation,
PENSIONS
&
INVESTMENTS
(July
25,
2011),
http://www.pionline.com/article/20110725/PRINTSUB/307259985/
(identifying a growing trend among institutional investors to opt out of large class
actions in light of successful individual settlements that have been up to fifty
times larger than class settlements).
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with fear, thereby making Morrison an even more welcome
decision. Finally, a careful reader of the Court‘s opinion will have
noticed another reason for celebration in those circles. For, in the
course of rejecting the Solicitor General‘s proposed ―significant and
material conduct‖ test, the majority observed that someone
―attracted by the desirable consequences of‖ that test ―should also
be repulsed by its adverse consequences.‖11
Justice Scalia
continued: ―While there is no reason to believe that the United
States has become the Barbary Coast for those perpetrating frauds
on foreign securities markets, some fear that it has become the
Shangri-La of class-action litigation for lawyers representing those
allegedly cheated in foreign securities markets.‖12 A majority of
the Court was here signaling hostility to class actions that is not
confined to the securities laws.
One of the foundational assumptions of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is that the same rules apply in every type of case –
they are trans-substantive.13 As a result, interpretations of Federal
Rules that favor access to court do so over the entire domain of
federal and state substantive law that governs actions in federal
court. In the case of the federal class action rule, Rule 23, the result
has been that, from the perspective of private enforcement, it has
been a wild card, fortuitously serving or frustrating the
enforcement goals of Congress and state legislatures.14 In recent
decades, however, an increasingly conservative federal judiciary
has repented the early and sometimes unreflective embrace of Rule
23 and has made it progressively more difficult for classes to be

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886.
Id.
13 See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules”, 2009
WIS. L. REV. 535, 541–42 (discussing the assumption that ―general rules‖ require
uniformity across both geography and subject matter by the Advisory Committee
appointed by the 1935 Supreme Court).
14 See Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private
Enforcement of Statutory and Administrative Law in the United States (and Other
Common Law Countries) 47–48 (Scholarship at Penn Law, Paper No. 356, 2011),
available at http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn_wps/356/ (discussing the fact that Rule
23 creates incentives for private enforcement, but ―might yield inefficient overenforcement‖); Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the
Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 53–74 (2010) (describing
the development of Rule 23 and arguing that the plurality opinion in Shady Grove
failed to accord state regulatory policy proper respect, preferring formalism to
pragmatism).
11
12
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certified.15 This belt-tightening also has been necessarily transsubstantive. In addition, at least when controlled by Republicans,
Congress has abetted the process of retrenchment, both directly
through substance-specific legislation like the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 199516 and indirectly through CAFA.
The hostility to class actions, suggested in Justice Scalia‘s
dictum in Morrison, was given room to operate with actual
consequences in his opinion for the Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes.17 Nobody I know thought that the enormous national class
certified in that employment discrimination case could survive
review, and there were some who thought the decision might be
unanimous. The Court was unanimous in reversing certification,
but it was split 5-4 on the reasons for that decision. Speaking
through Justice Scalia, the conservative majority put forty-five
years of class action jurisprudence in question by very restrictively
interpreting the so-called ―commonality‖ requirement of Rule
23(a).18 Together with decisions of courts of appeals imposing
trial-like evidentiary burdens on proponents of class certification,
including with respect to evidence offered by experts,19 Wal-Mart
suggests that prospective foreign defendants should look more
closely before they quake.
Of course, just as differences in procedure may better explain
both an initial choice of forum and a forum non conveniens motion
than do substantive law differences,20 potentially ruinous liability
15 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1489–99, 1507 (noting the increasingly
stringent application of the predominance requirement and other more
demanding class certification requirements as a response to mass tort claims).
16 Pub. L. No 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class
Action in American Securities Regulation, 4 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ZIVILPROZESS INT‘L 321,
329–32 (1999) (evaluating the motivations underpinning the 1995 Republican
Congress‘s adoption of the securities litigation reform act and its impact on
securities litigation).
17 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
18 See id. at 2550–57 (holding that commonality requires plaintiffs to show
that each member of the class suffered an identical injury that permits class-wide
resolution of a single common question).
19 See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir.
2008) (requiring factual determinations supporting certification to be made by a
preponderance of the evidence and making clear that district courts must weigh
conflicting expert testimony at the certification stage).
20 See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, The Proposed Hague
Convention and Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203, 242 (2001) (―The
realities of international forum selection revealed by decisions in the United States
and abroad demonstrate that the American legal system is distinctive as much for
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on the merits is not the only reason foreign defendants want to
avoid litigation in American courts. From that perspective, there is
a good news/bad news quality to the increasingly agnostic, if not
skeptical, posture of the federal courts with respect to class
certification.
For the more class certification procedure is
assimilated to trial procedure, the more discovery courts will have
to permit before ruling on certification. Moreover, even though
good social science does not support claims that discovery
everywhere and always imposes disproportionate expense,21 it
clearly may do so in complex, high-stakes cases of which class
actions constitute the core. Indeed, the perfect storm of another
enormous class action and the enormous cost of discovery that it
could have entailed caused the Court, in 2007, to begin a process of
dismantling the system of so-called ―notice pleading‖ that had
been in place since 1938 and that the Court had repeatedly
reaffirmed in the intervening years. I refer to the Supreme Court‘s
decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,22 a massive putative class
action that alleged an antitrust conspiracy by the firms remaining
after the breakup of AT&T.
Believing that the cost of discovery is a widespread problem
which federal judges are incapable of managing and that summary
judgment comes too late—without evidence and without even
referring to three sets of Federal Rules amendments addressing
discovery over the past twenty years —23the Court sought to solve
those problems not through interpretation of the discovery rules,
but through judicial amendment of the pleading rules, thus
facilitating early dismissals. Since those rules, like all Federal
Rules, are trans-substantive, the resulting requirement that
plaintiffs plead sufficient factual matter, taken as true, to state a
claim that is ―plausible‖ applies across-the-board.24 The Court

the rules by which it ensures and fructifies access to court as by its rules of
substantive law.‖).
21 See, e.g., Linda Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of
Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences of Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1393 (1994) (chronicling the absence of any strong evidence of discovery
abuse at the federal level and the failure of the rulemaking committee to evaluate
its absence before embarking on discovery reform).
22 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
23 See id. at 558–60 (presuming antitrust discovery to be a costly affair that
forces cost-conscious defendants to settle even when faced with a weaker case).
24 See Burbank, supra note 13, at 561–62 (discussing the judiciary‘s role in
reinterpreting the trans-substantive pleading rules and a nation-wide movement
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specifically so affirmed in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,25 a 2009 decision in
which the conservative majority consigned judgments about the
plausibility of a complaint‘s allegations to the tender mercy of
―judicial experience and common sense.‖26 The result should be
cause for celebration by Chambers of Commerce everywhere,
whatever baneful effect it has on access to court for the usual
victims of procedural reform in a society that is allergic to robust
public enforcement of statutory and administrative law. The
courthouse door must be closed to employment discrimination
plaintiffs so that corporate defendants are spared potentially
disproportionate discovery costs.
Finally, by way of evidence that the traditional view abroad of
litigation in American courts may not have kept pace with more
recent developments, Wal-Mart was not the only decision of the
just-ended term of the Supreme Court that foreign enterprise
should greet with champagne. CAFA has taken care of most of the
mischief, real or imagined, perpetrated by state courts in large class
actions. But, except for so-called ―mass actions,‖27 CAFA does
nothing to address excesses of forum shopping in litigation
brought on behalf of individuals, including in particular litigation
raising product liability claims. In two cases testing federal
constitutional limitations on assertions of personal jurisdiction by
state courts, the Supreme Court made it harder to sue foreign
defendants.
In one of those cases, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown,28 a unanimous Court reaffirmed the proposition that
general jurisdiction based on the defendant‘s business activities—
where the claim does not arise out of those activities in the
forum—is available only in situations where the defendant has

of chipping away at private litigation regimes to compensate injuries and enforce
societal norms).
25 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–53 (2009) (holding that the Twombly plausibility
requirement does not just apply to antitrust claims, but to all civil actions as a
general pleading requirement).
26 Id. at 1950. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern
American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 115 (2009) (―Relying on ‗judicial experience
and common sense,‘ the Court found the complaint implausible . . . . [T]he Court
also made clear that its approach applies across the board—that Twombly cannot
be confined to its substantive context . . . or according to some other criterion.‖).
27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11) (2006) (defining ―mass action‖); id. § 11(A)
(2006) (providing that it ―shall be deemed to be a class action‖).
28 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850–51 (2011).
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conducted substantial systematic and continuous activities in the
forum such that it can be deemed ―at home‖ in that forum, a test
that now may require that a corporation either be incorporated or
have its principal place of business in the forum.29 In the other, J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. V. Nicastro,30 a badly divided Court held
unconstitutional an assertion of specific jurisdiction by a state court
in a case brought by a plaintiff who was injured in that state by a
product manufactured in the United Kingdom by a company that
engaged an independent distributor to market its products
throughout the United States. The type of jurisdiction was specific
rather than general because the plaintiff‘s claim arose out of the
operation of defendant‘s product in the state where he sued. The
constitutional issue turned on whether presence of the putatively
defective machine in the state was the result of purposeful efforts
of the defendant.
Goodyear is reasonably well done. Unfortunately, however,
Justice Ginsburg‘s opinion for the Court does not manifest
understanding that, in thinking about doing business jurisdiction
as involving defendants ―essentially at home,‖31 the Court is
replacing the fiction of presence, which it rejected long ago, with
the fiction of domicile.32 One might think that harmless error, but
footnote 5 in the opinion strongly suggests that it is not. There,
Justice Ginsburg confuses the question whether a plaintiff‘s
nationality or domicile can ground general jurisdiction with the
question whether plaintiff‘s nationality or domicile can be
considered in the kind of all-things-considered due process

29 See id. at 2850–58. Of course, incorporation in the state is itself a sufficient
basis for general jurisdiction by analogy to a natural person‘s domicile. See
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462–65 (1940) (holding that domicile alone is
sufficient to exercise general jurisdiction); Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: End of the Century or Beginning of the Millennium?, 7 TULANE J. INT‘L &
COMP. L. 111, 118, 122 (1999) (justifying jurisdiction on that basis through ex ante
categorical balancing).
30 J. McIntyre Mach. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
31 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
32 See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Conflict and Jurisdictional Equilibration:
Paths to a Via Media?, 26 HOUS. J. INT‘L L. 385, 390–91 (2004) (―It is one thing to say
that a corporation should not be heard to complain if sued on an unrelated claim
in the place that is its legal home. It is quite another endlessly to proliferate such
homes—to debase the notion of a jurisdictional ‗headquarters‘—in the process
neglecting the fact that the original fiction was ‗presence,‘ not ‗domicile.‘‖)
(footnotes omitted).
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analysis that I believe is appropriate for both specific and general
doing business jurisdiction.33
In most cases of general activity-based jurisdiction, except
perhaps those involving law animated by a deterrent purpose, the
state lacks the sort of regulatory interest that, I was happy to see,
the Court recognized as typical of cases involving specific
jurisdiction.34 In addition, unless the plaintiff is domiciled in the
state where she sues, in most cases of general activity-based
jurisdiction, it is hard to discern a legitimate plaintiff or state
interest in having or providing access to the forum. But the
Court‘s footnote seems to foreclose such reasoning altogether. Of
course, the chosen metaphor (or fiction) also seems to foreclose the
possibility that due process in the context of general doing
business jurisdiction might mean one thing for a domestic
corporation, which will always have at least one ―home‖ in the
United States, and a foreign corporation, which usually will not.35
Nicastro is close to an unmitigated disaster. Justice Kennedy for
the plurality again proves himself distinguished only at platitudes
(―the Constitution commands restraint before discarding liberty in
the name of expediency‖).36 He manages both to acknowledge and
confound the Court‘s belated recognition that due process protects
individual and not sovereign interests, and having observed that
the case ―presents an opportunity to provide greater clarity,‖37
proceeds to spread darkness rather than light. The whole notion
that grounds of general jurisdiction—and in particular tag
service—can be explained on a theory of consent or submission38 is
33 See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 n.5; see also Burbank, supra note 2, 749–53
(2004) (discussing the due process analysis that is appropriate for general doing
business jurisdiction).
34 See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2855 (―[T]ies serving to bolster the exercise of
specific jurisdiction do not warrant a determination that, based on those ties, the
forum has general jurisdiction over a defendant.‖) (emphasis original).
35 See Burbank, supra note 2, at 753 n.55 (pointing out that domestic
defendants will always have domicile or place of incorporation in the United
States and, therefore, will be subject to general jurisdiction, while foreign
defendants have no ―such legal home in this country‖).
36 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791.
37 Id. at 2786.
38 See id. at 278 (―A person may submit to a State's authority in a number of
ways. There is, of course, explicit consent . . . . Presence within a State at the time
suit commences through service of process is another example . . . . Citizenship or
domicile—or, by analogy, incorporation or principal place of business for
corporations—also indicates general submission to a State's powers.‖).
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pure fiction and a far cry from the relational theories that some
scholars have articulated.39 The same is true of Kennedy‘s attempt
to extend that justification to specific jurisdiction. An exercise of
power does not indicate either submission or intent to submit to
authority, unless submission is conceived in terms of brute force.
Justice Ginsburg‘s dissent is a far better-crafted opinion.
Particularly noteworthy is her recognition that American states are
irrelevant for purposes of international law and that the result in
this case contrasts with the way in which the case would be
decided in the EU (and thus could be thought to put U.S.
manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage).40 For the present,
and depending upon the views of Justice Breyer and Justice Alito,
who concurred in the judgment,41 Nicastro deserves close study by
counsel to foreign manufacturers that want to serve the U.S.
market but do not want to be sued there.
There you have it: recent developments in three different
doctrinal areas that make litigation harder to maintain in United
States courts. I am reminded of empirical work by Kevin Clermont
and Theodore Eisenberg demonstrating that, contrary to
traditional wisdom, foreign litigants, both as plaintiffs and
defendants, fare better than domestic litigants in the federal
courts.42 Granting the power of the explanation they suggest for
39 See ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ADJUDICATORY
AUTHORITY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE
DOCTRINE, POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF COMMON- AND CIVIL-LAW SYSTEMS 29–36
(2003) (discussing relational, power and instrumental theories of jurisdiction);
Burbank, supra note 2, at 742–43 (reviewing von Mehren and outlining the key
arguments in the text).
40 See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2801, 2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that
McIntyre UK should be brought to trial in the United States because it chose to do
business in the United States as a nation and was not concerned with its
component States and that the European Court of Justice would have exercised
jurisdiction in an identical case, suggesting a disadvantage for U.S. plaintiffs); see
also Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 24 n.14,
J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2791 (2011) (No. 09-1343)
(questioning whether foreign defendants should be required to establish
minimum contacts with any particular state, rather than the United States as a
single entity). The author contributed to this amicus brief.
41 See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791–94 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)
(refusing to depart from what, in Justice Breyer‘s opinion, is settled precedent).
Justice Alito joined Justice Breyer‘s opinion.
42 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American
Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1122 (1996) (discussing empirical study showing
that foreign defendants and plaintiffs actually win more often and offering
tentative explanations of their results).
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their results—case selection driven in part by the traditional
wisdom—43 now may be a particularly good time to reassess how
well the traditional wisdom about American litigation reflects
reality. There is evidence of greater affinity for at least some
aspects of American litigation in Europe. To the extent that the
move towards greater reliance on private enforcement, including
through representative litigation, is attributable to the direct and
indirect power of the European Union,44 the traditional forces for
the status quo are at risk, and the reassessment I have counseled
should include comparative dimensions.

43 See id. at 1133 (―We believe that the most plausible and powerful
explanation for the foreigner effect is that foreigners are reluctant to litigate in
America for a variety of reasons, including the apprehension that American courts
exhibit xenophobic bias and the pecuniary and non-pecuniary distastes for
litigating in a distant place.‖) (footnotes omitted).
44 See Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 14, at 100 (suggesting that EU
member states turned to private enforcement due to institutional fragmentation in
the EU that is akin to the separation of powers dynamic driving private
enforcement in the United States).

